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9 May 1958

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 May 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

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## LATE ITEM

\*USSR central committee meeting: The Soviet news agency TASS has announced that the central committee of the USSR Communist party convened on 6 and 7 May to discuss higher priorities for the production of consumer goods. While a part of the session was probably devoted to this general economic problem, it seems likely that such pressing internal and foreign policy issues as the manner in which Yugoslavia could be brought to heel by the bloc as a whole, played a significant part in prompting the meeting. A preliminary analysis of Moscow press coverage suggests that central committee debate resulted in a sort of compromise--a softer internal economic policy of increasing consumer goods production, and a tougher Communist bloc attitude toward Yugoslavia.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*yes*

\*Polish position in the Yugoslav dispute: Pravda's re-publication of Peiping's denunciation of Tito tightens the squeeze on Gomulka, who would like to avoid taking an unequivocal stand on the Yugoslav "heresies." Gomulka's renunciation of these "heresies" would tend to compromise the program on which the Polish leader's regime is based. Gomulka's current tour of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania offers an opportunity for the USSR to bring further pressure on him. Tito's projected visit to Poland in late May, which was set up on a party as well as state level, increases the difficulties of Gomulka's position. Western press reports indicate that Polish Communists, presumably liberals, have reacted to the Chinese denunciation by attributing it to an effort by Peiping to support a so-called "Molotov faction's" Stalinist line in intra-bloc relations.   
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## II. ASIA-AFRICA



*W* Watch Committee conclusion -- Indonesia: Significant numbers of Soviet bloc arms and technicians are arriving in Indonesia. There are no developments indicating a Sino-Soviet bloc intention to become directly involved in military

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operations in Indonesia. The situation continues to favor local Communist and Sino-Soviet bloc exploitation.

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*no*  
Israel-Jordan: The issue of Israeli access to the Mt. Scopus area of Jerusalem has again been raised by Jordan's refusal to allow two Israelis to accompany a convoy into the area. The Israeli foreign minister has decided that the convoy will not proceed without the two Israelis. She states Jordan has no right to challenge convoy personnel.


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*yes*  
Syria: Symptoms of a local competition for power in the Syrian region of the UAR are appearing. Rightist as well as pro-Soviet newspapers are attacking Socialist leader Hawrani, UAR vice president who heads the Arab Socialist Resurrection party in Syria. These attacks probably have the backing of Interior Minister Sarraj. Whether Sarraj is acting on his own or on orders from Nasir, Hawrani's prestige will probably suffer a setback.

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Afghanistan: Kabul plans an unusually elaborate celebration in August including a trade fair, in honor of the fortieth anniversary of its independence. It has announced that nine countries have already agreed to take part, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Communist China.

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### III. THE WEST

*yes*  
Greek elections: The conservative National Radical Union (ERE) of former Premier Karamanlis is expected by many observers in Athens to win a plurality and possibly a majority in the 11 May national elections. It is still uncertain, however, whether an ERE majority will be large enough--at least 160 out of 300 seats--to assure continued government stability. Meanwhile, the Communist front United Democratic Left (EDA) appears to be gaining some support and its representation in parliament--now 17--may be enlarged, but will probably remain relatively small.

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### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

*no*  
(Available during the preceding week)

National Intelligence Estimate No. 82-58. The Outlook for Guatemala. 29 April 1958.

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The Arab-Israeli Situation. A working paper prepared by an ad hoc working group of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Revised as of 1 May 1958.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Gomulka Caught in Bloc-Yugoslav Cross Fire

Pravda's republication of Peiping's attack on the Yugoslav party's draft program increases the pressure on Gomulka to make a statement on Polish policy toward Yugoslavia. The Polish leader to date has avoided taking a definitive stand on the issue. The Polish official press claimed "serious reservations" about certain features of the program but asserted that the existing ideological differences neither constitute a threat to interparty relations nor repeat the situation in 1948 when Tito broke with the Cominform.


During Gomulka's current tour of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, he will be especially vulnerable to these pressures, but he will resist them as long as possible. At a reception in Sofia, he ignored statements in Bulgarian First Secretary Zhivkov's address which emphasized the unity of the bloc parties "with the CPSU at the head." Gomulka has always acknowledged the USSR as the leading Socialist country but has refused to admit that any individual party headed the union of bloc parties.

Tito's scheduled visit to Poland late this month will further intensify the difficulties of Gomulka's position. First he must decide whether popular approbation in Poland is worth the risk of incurring Soviet displeasure by going through with the invitation. Then if the visit takes place he must find a way to avoid associating Poland with Tito's ideological program. Failure to follow the new bloc line on Yugoslavia, may ultimately result in some Soviet threat to Gomulka's independence in the management of Polish internal affairs, which has been contingent on close adherence to bloc foreign policy.

Western press reports indicate that Polish Communists, presumably liberal, have reacted to the Chinese denunciation by attributing it to an effort by Peiping to support a so-called "Molotov faction's" Stalinist line in intra-bloc relations.

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Jerusalem - Mt. Scopus Convoy

The new dispute over Israel's regular fortnightly relief convoy to Mt. Scopus may be in part a Jordanian reaction to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's recent bellicose remarks about Israel's future use of the demilitarized enclave outside Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion asserted in a public speech on 27 April that if the UN did not implement Article VIII of the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement, according to which the "normal functioning" of the hospital and Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus were to be resumed, the Israelis would implement it "by themselves."

Jordan has refused to permit two members of the Israeli relief party to proceed with the fortnightly convoy through Jordanian territory on the ground that they are Israeli "spies" who were convicted in Jordanian civil courts and deported to Israel. The Jordanians apparently suspect that the Israelis intend to reinfiltrate the two men into Jordan. Foreign Minister Rifai has emphasized that the passage of the remainder of the convoy is not blocked.

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir, however, has decided the convoy will not proceed until the two challenged men can go with it. She claims they are merely a librarian and laborer scheduled to perform routine maintenance tasks, and that in any case Jordan has no right to challenge convoy personnel.

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### Factionalism Breaks Out in Syria

Disputes over a proposed land reform law have turned into a direct press attack by both pro-Soviet and conservative Syrian factions on UAR Vice President and Baathist leader Akram Hawrani. Since the union between Egypt and Syria, political parties have been "dissolved" and the party press had been permitted to indulge in assaults only by innuendo.

Hawrani recently accused conservative groups urging modification of his proposed agrarian labor reform law of being "imperialist" elements who are "plotting" against the regime and ought to be liquidated. A strange alliance of pro-Soviet and conservative newspapers retaliated by a direct attack on the Baath and Hawrani. They have suggested that he be transferred to Egypt.

The condoning of these attacks by Interior Minister Sarraj, despite his recent order to the press not to criticize government servants, suggests Sarraj is seeking to embarrass Hawrani, his archrival for leadership in Syria, or that he is acting on Nasir's orders. Sarraj has been reported irritated by Hawrani's pretensions to top leadership. Hawrani, who in the past has supported a number of radical political ventures, including Col. Shishakli's dictatorship, has always split with his colleagues when his views were not wholly supported.

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Afghan Trade Fair to Have Heavy Communist Participation

The Communist bloc is preparing to exploit the week-long celebration beginning on 23 August of Afghanistan's 40th anniversary of independence, for which Kabul has ambitious plans. The Afghans were pleased at the foreign interest shown in the international trade fair held in Kabul in 1956, for which the USSR, Communist China, and Czechoslovakia built permanent pavilions.

Kabul expects to stage an even more impressive international trade fair in connection with the 1958 celebration, and hopes for participation by as many as 22 nations. So far, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Communist China have agreed to participate in the fair. The United Arab Republic, Iran, West Germany, and Austria will also be represented.

Afghan interest in the celebration is further indicated by Prime Minister Daud's reported order that Afghan army units be equipped with new Soviet weapons in time for the anniversary week, which presumably will feature demonstrations of Afghanistan's military modernization.

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### III. THE WEST

#### Greek Elections

Existence of a large bloc of uncommitted voters tends to cloud the outcome of the 11 May Greek national elections following the quietest campaign in recent Greek history. The conservative National Radical Union (ERE) of former Premier Karamanlis, however, is expected by both Greek and foreign observers to receive at least a large plurality and probably an absolute majority of seats in the next chamber of deputies. While ERE has lost ground in urban centers since the election of 1956, it remains strong in the rural areas. The complex electoral law will permit ERE to obtain a majority of 160 seats out of 300 in the chamber if it secures as much as 40 percent of the total vote. Karamanlis will need at least that many seats if he is to form a stable one-party government with a good possibility of maintaining power for the full parliamentary term of four years.

The other political parties and coalitions in the elections are not expected to approach ERE's representation, although leaders of the center Liberal party are optimistic about their chances of increasing Liberal strength in the new chamber. Two coalitions, one of the far right and the other of the left center, are not expected to figure significantly in the future distribution of seats.

The United Democratic Left (EDA), front for the illegal Communist party of Greece, has attracted votes by conducting a circumspect and dignified campaign, supplemented by the expenditure of large sums of money. The good will thus engendered for EDA, however, may have been more than offset by the hostile reaction in Greece to what is regarded as an attempt by Soviet Premier Khrushchev to intervene in the campaign. Existence in Greece of a sizable protest vote against the policies of the pro-Western parties will probably give EDA enough votes to increase its strength above the 17 seats it held in the last parliament.

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